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FROM OUTLAWS TO IN-LAWS:
ISSuES SURROUNDING THE EVOLVING LEGAL
STATUS OF LESBIAN AND GAY INDIVIDUALS
Foreword
In 1986, the late United States Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell,
Jr. remarked to his fellow justices and a law clerk that he had never known
a homosexual. That same year, Justice Powell would cast a crucial vote in
Bowers v. Hardwick, the decision that denied any fundamental right to
engage in homosexual sodomy existed. Justice Powell was incorrect. His
decision in Bowers aside, he was incorrect that he had never known a
homosexual. His law clerk that overheard the remark was gay.
If there ever existed a time when homosexuals were strangers to the
Supreme Court or its Justices, that time has surely passed. Today, the
judicial system plays a significant, if not the most significant, role in
defining the legal implications of homosexuality. From equal protection to
the First Amendment to due process, the constitutional implications of
homosexual status are wide in breadth, despite the relatively short amount
of time the law has struggled with homosexuality.
A legal symposium in 2001 exploring the interaction between the law
and homosexuality is not groundbreaking. For the past two decades, social,
political, and moral arguments (if one can so neatly categorize them)
concerning homosexuality have fomented at the front of our national
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dialogue. From arguments challenging the constitutionality of sodomy laws
to the passage of antidiscrimination legislation, the legal system has been
placed in the position of constructing, defining, and often implementing the
legal ramifications of one's sexual orientation.
The legal treatment of homosexuality, however, is changing. Previ-
ously, homosexuality was conceptualized as conduct that was easily
distinguishable from the individual who engaged in that conduct. Thus,
decisions such as Bowers quaintly ruminated over the existence of a
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy. The question of
whether there was a fundamental rightto be homosexual was not addressed.
Perhaps it did not exist. The law's conceptualization of homosexuality has
transformed from an independent activity to a status fused with the
individual. The legal issues have concomitantly changed. Current issues
surrounding homosexuality address not the constitutional implications of
a homosexual act, but rather the constitutional implications of a homosex-
ual status. The identity of homosexuality not only affects the lesbian or gay
individual but also individuals or groups in her or his surrounding, such as
the case in Boy Scouts of-America v. Dale. The legal adoption of homosex-
uality as status has spawned a new host of issues: What does it mean to be
gay? Is there a message in one's gayness? Is the status of homosexuality
equivalent to a heterosexual status? And, if so, what role should the legal
system play in achieving that equality? This journal issue endeavors to
further such dialogue, capturing current legal issues surrounding homosex-
uality, from the constitutional ramifications of civil unions to the expres-
sive nature of a homosexual identity and beyond.
The Symposium is introduced with an Essay by Professor Nan Hunter.
Hunter's Essay takes a retrospective look at the legal fallout from the
controversial Supreme Court decision Romer v. Evans. While hesitating to
ascribe any great doctrinal lesson from Romer, Professor Hunter explores
the effect of the decision on equal protection analysis. Notably, Hunter
views the ultimate effect of the case as being a strong, useful check on the
categorical inequality present before the decision.
The lead Article in the issue is A "Clanging Silence ": Same-Sex
Couples and Tort Law by Professor John Culhane. Culhane explores the
fertile world of tort law and the noticeable absence of application of
traditional tort theory to same-sex couples. Focusing on the torts of
negligent infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium, and wrongful
death, Culhane's Article argues that foundational principles in these torts
should be applied to same-sex couples, and, furthermore, such application
aids in the validation of such relationships..
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Professor Nancy Knauer's Article, "Simply So Different": The
Uniquely Expressive Character of the Openly Gay Individual After Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale, offers a unique response to the controversial
2000 Supreme Court decision. While finding fundamental flaws in the Dale
majority opinion, Professor Knauer primarily takes issue with Justice
Stevens's dissent. Knauer advances that perhaps gay identity is so unique
in society today that the mere presence of an openly gay individual does
"send a message," as the majority opinion held, that can and does alter
existing group messages.
Vermont Civil Unions, Full Faith and Credit, and Marital Status by
Professor Lewis Silverman explores the thorny issue of sister state
recognition of civil unionized same-sex couples. Silverman's conclusion
that same-sex couples can rely on the guarantees found in the Full Faith and
Credit Clause redounds not from the presence of the civil union per se, but
rather from the couple's "marital status" that is created from the denial of
the right of either party to a civil union to many in another jurisdiction.
Professor Christopher R. Leslie catalogs the weighty obstacles placed
before homosexuals attempting to attack laws specifically aimed at
homosexuals with his Article, Procedural Rules or Procedural Pretexts?:
A Case Study of Procedural Hurdles in Constitutional Challenges to the
Texas Sodomy Law. Leslie explores the myriad examples of how one state
sodomy law has been insulated from attack by the bending and torturing of
legal doctrine.
Of primary importance to Kentucky practitioners is Matt Morrison's
Currents in the Stream: The Evolving Legal Status of Gay and Lesbian
Persons in Kentucky. In an unparalleled historical comment on the origins,
defeats, and tribulations of gay and lesbian Kentuckians and the law,
Morrison's piece traces the origins of Kentucky laws relating to homosexu-
ality back to medieval times. Morrison's Article ranges from the earliest
sodomy laws to the current antidiscrimination laws in place throughout the
State.
The Symposium concludes with two student Notes. The first, Romer,
Hurley, and Dale: How the Supreme Court Languishes with "Special
Rights," takes a critical eye to the Court's handling of homosexual identity
and its concomitant constitutional implications. The second student Note,
A Family Affair: Constitutional and Prudential Interests Implicated When
Homosexuals Seek to Preserve or Create Parent-Child Relationships,
explores the burgeoning legal world of family law and homosexuality,
specifically reviewing case law regarding custody, visitation, and adoption
issues.
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